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Abstract
Much has been written about procedures and remedies under the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, but few scholars have
explored procedural rights and corresponding mechanisms of
administrative and judicial relief for victims of public schools’ violations
of children’s rights under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
and title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. This paper will
discuss the administrative procedures that must be followed in hearings
regarding complaints of violations of those laws by public school
districts and the relief that hearing officers and courts may provide. It
will begin with an update on developments regarding eligibility and
substantive protections under section 504 and title II, then take up
administrative process matters, including hearing officer impartiality,
demands to examine and cross-examine witnesses, and judicial review of
administrative decisions. Finally, it will consider remedies that may be
ordered by hearing officers and courts. This paper builds on the earlier
research of the author and of other writers, who have developed theories
about how section 504 and title II should be applied to students in public
elementary and secondary schools.
Recent developents, most
significantly the ADA Amendments Act and the Mark H. litigation in the
Ninth Circuit, will have a major effect on section 504 and title II cases.
However, the Amendments Act and the Mark H. decisions are merely the
starting point for a new area of legal development that may have great
signficance for the administrative law judiciary.
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Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 1 and title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) 2 protect public school children
who have disabilities. To obtain remedies under those laws, however,
children and their parents frequently must resort to hearing procedures
before members of the administrative law judiciary. Much has been
written about procedures and remedies under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 3 But little has been written about
procedures and remedies under section 504 and the ADA, 4 leaving the
scholarship in the area underdeveloped. 5 This article seeks to close the
gap in the commentary and contribute to the scholarly dialogue on
procedural and remedial issues in cases involving public schoolchildren
who are making claims that their rights under section 504 and the ADA
have been violated.
It is an apt time for this dialogue to take place. Although school
districts are growing progressively more resistant to identifying children

1

29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006). The law protects otherwise qualified individuals with a disability against
exclusion from participation in, denial of benefits of, and discrimination under, programs or
activities receiving federal financial assistance. Id.
2
42 U.S.C. §§ 12131–12150 (2006). The law protects qualified individuals with a disability against
exclusion from participation in, denial of benefits of, and discrimination under, services, programs,
or activities of state and local government. Id. § 12132.
3
20 U.S.C. §§ 1400-1482 (2006). A sampling of recent work on IDEA procedures and remedies
includes: Sonja Kerr, Mediation of Special Education Disputes in Pennsylvania, 15 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 179 (2012); Eloise Pasachoff, Special Education, Poverty, and the Limits of Private
Enforcement, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1413 (2011); Jon Romberg, The Means Justify the Ends:
Structural Due Process in Special Education Law, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 415 (2011); Mark C.
Weber, Settling Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Cases: Making Up Is Hard to Do, 43
LOY. L.A. L. REV. 641 (2010); Perry A. Zirkel, Case Law for Functional Behavioral Assessments
and Behavior Intervention Plans: An Empirical Analysis, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 175 (2011); Natalie
Pyong Kocher, Note, Lost in Forest Grove: Interpreting IDEA’s Inherent Paradox, 21 HASTINGS
WOMEN’S L.J. 333 (2010); Brianna L. Lennon, Note, Cut and Run? Tuition Reimbursement and the
1997 IDEA Amendments, 75 MO. L. REV. 1297 (2010); T. Daris Isbell, Note, Distinguishing
Between Compensatory Education and Additional Services as Remedies Under the IDEA, 76
BROOK. L. REV. 1717 (2011).
4
Damages remedies under section 504 and the ADA have received some development. See, e.g.,
Sarah Poston, Developments in Federal Disability Discrimination Law: An Emerging Resolution to
the Section 504 Damages Issue, 1992-93 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 419 (1994); Paul M. Secunda, At the
Crossroads of Title IX and a New “IDEA”: Why Bullying Need Not Be “a Normal Part of Growing
Up” for Special Education Children, 12 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 1, 31 (2005) (discussing
redress for bullying under section 504 and the ADA); Mark C. Weber, Damages Liability in Special
Education Cases, 21 REV. LITIG. 83 (2002). Of the remaining commentary, much concerns
eligibility for and accommodations in athletics. See, e.g., James P. Looby, Reasonable
Accommodations for High School Athletes with Disabilities: Preserving Sports While Providing
Access for All, 19 Sports Law. J. 227 (2012); Tessie E. Rose & Dixie Snow Huefner, High School
Athletic Age-Restriction Rules Continue to Discriminate Against Students with Disabilities, 196
WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 385 (2005); Kimberly M. Brown, Comment, Leveling the Playing Field: A
Commentary on the Impact of High School Athletic Eligibility Requirements on Students with
Learning Disabilities, 4 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 255 (2008); Brooke A.
Frederickson, The Age Nineteen Rule and Students with Disabilities: Discrimination Against
Disabled Students with Athletic Ability, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 635 (2003).
5
Professor Zirkel’s work is a notable exception, and will be discussed at various points in this
Article. An article of mine that takes up the issues in brief following a longer discussion of
substantive entitlements under the two statutes is Mark C. Weber, A New Look at Section 504 and
the ADA in Special Education Cases, 16 TEX. J. ON C.L. & C.R. 1 (2010).
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as entitled to the protections of IDEA, 6 Congress has recently extended
the coverage of section 504 and the ADA to large numbers of children
through the redefinition of “individuals with disabilities” in the ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, effective January 1, 2009. 7 The ADA
Amendments Act overturns Supreme Court precedent that had narrowed
the coverage of the ADA and section 504, provides that impairments are
to be considered in their unmitigated state when considering if an
individual has a disability, and greatly expands the definition of major
life activities provided in the statute’s coverage provision.8 In the past,
section 504 and the ADA have typically been used as supplemental
causes of action in cases involving children in the public schools,
frequently being asserted when a student who is eligible for services
under IDEA wants compensatory damages relief. 9 In addition, in the
words of Professor Zirkel, “Section 504 is often used as a consolation
prize in the wake of a determination of non-eligibility for an IEP
[individualized education program] under the IDEA.” 10
As the
“consolation prize” becomes the prize itself, the rules and object of the
contest will become progressively more important.
Upon analyzing the relevant statutory and regulatory provisions,
this Article will conclude that section 504 and the ADA require school
districts to afford significant procedural protections to students with
disabilities, and that hearing officers and courts may award a wide range
of remedies in section 504 and ADA cases. The text of the applicable
section 504 regulation affords the basic right to a hearing; due process
principles provide support for the implication of specific rights regarding
impartiality, examination of witnesses, and other topics, even if the
procedural protections are not all that parties might desire. Remedies in
section 504 and ADA cases include compensatory damages and
attorneys’ fees, although hearing officers may not be empowered to
award them under state law and practice; courts will need to provide
these remedies in follow-up litigation. Other remedies should be freely

6
Mark C. Weber, The IDEA Eligibility Mess, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 83, 102-22 (2009); see Anello v.
Indian River Sch. Dist., 355 F. App’x 594 (3d Cir. 2009) (upholding summary judgment in favor of
school district on claim that child should have been found IDEA-eligible earlier, noting child’s
success under section 504 plan); Brado v. Weast, No. CIV. PJM 07-2696, 2010 WL 333760 (D. Md.
Jan. 26, 2010) (holding that child with section 504 plan was not eligible under IDEA); A.J. v. Bd. of
Educ., E. Islip Union Free Sch. Dist., 679 F. Supp. 2d 299 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding child with
Asperger syndrome ineligible on ground that academic performance was satisfactory); Chase v.
Mesa County Valley Sch. Dist. No. 51, No. CIV.A. 07-CV-00205RE, 2009 WL 3013752 (D. Colo.
Sept. 17, 2009) (holding that child managing average grades was properly terminated from special
education); E.M. v. Pajaro Valley Unified Sch. Dist., No. C 06-4694 JF, 2009 WL 2766704 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 27, 2009) (holding child continually at risk of grade retention not eligible on basis of
learning disability).
7
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
8
See infra text accompanying notes 21-35 (describing expansion of coverage of ADA in ADA
Amendments Act).
9
See infra text accompanying notes 165-76 (discussing damages relief under section 504 and ADA).
10
Perry A. Zirkel, Does Section 504 Require a Section 504 Plan for Each Eligible Non-IDEA
Student?, 40 J. L. & EDUC. 407, 414-15 (2011).
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available through the administrative hearing process: orders for future
conduct, tuition reimbursement, records amendments, and additional
equitable relief. Recent developments, including the ADA Amendments
Act and the Mark H. litigation in the Ninth Circuit,11 significantly affect
section 504 and title II rights. However, the Amendments Act and the
Mark H. decisions are merely the starting point for a new area of legal
development that may have great significance for the work of the
administrative law judiciary.
Parts I and II of this Article provide background by describing and
updating the law pertaining to coverage of public school children under
section 504 and IDEA (Part I) and entitlements under section the two
statutes (Part II). Part II will place emphasis on the right to services that
meet the needs of children with disabilities as adequately as the needs of
other children are met. Part III discusses procedures at length,
considering service plans, hearing officer impartiality, examination of
witnesses at hearing, and judicial review. Part IV takes up remedies,
including compensatory damages, tuition reimbursement and orders for
future conduct, and attorneys’ and expert witness fees.
I.

COVERAGE OF CHILDREN UNDER SECTION 504 AND THE ADA

Under section 504 and the ADA, disability is defined as a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of
the major life activities of an individual, a record of such an impairment,
or being regarded as having such an impairment.12 More than a decade
ago, Supreme Court held that this definition should be read narrowly, 13
and that impairments must be evaluated in their mitigated state, only
after considering any medical intervention or other mechanisms,
including those of the body’s own systems, 14 that the individual applies
to reduce the effect of the impairments. 15 It held that the “regarded as”
provision applies only if an employer or entity subject to the ADA
incorrectly believes that a person has a physical or mental impairment
that substantially limits one or more major life activities or erroneously
believes that an actual impairment substantially limits one or more major

11
Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008), appeal after remand, Mark H. v. Hamamoto,
620 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir 2010).
12
29 U.S.C.A. § 705(9)(B) (West 2012), 34 C.F.R. § 104.3(j) (2012) (section 504); 42 U.S.C.A. §
12102(2) (West 2012) (ADA).
13
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197 (2002), superseded by statute, ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008) (“[T]hese [definitional] terms
need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled . . . .”).
14
An example would be the unconscious correction that the brain makes when a person has unequal
vision in the two eyes. See Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. 555, 565–66 (1999).
15
Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 482 (1999), superseded by statute, ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (2008).
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life activities.16 According to the Court, to be substantially limited in the
major life activity of performing manual tasks, an individual had to be
prevented or severely restricted “from doing activities that are of central
importance to most people’s daily lives,” and that the restriction had to
be “permanent or long term.” 17 Other courts adopted further restrictive
readings of the definitional provisions.18 Commentators complained that
the interpretations of the ambiguous definitional terms contradicted the
ADA’s legislative history, 19 and that the Court’s approach created a
dilemma for claimants: the more a person did to minimize the effects of
an impairment and become better able to perform a job, to use
government services, or to take advantage of public accommodations, the
more likely the person was to be excluded from the protections of the
Act. 20
The ADA Amendments Act, passed in 2008 and effective January
1, 2009, changes the definitional terms of the ADA and section 504.21 It
explicitly disapproves the major Supreme Court cases that limited the
coverage of the ADA and section 504. 22 It declares that the definition of
disability “shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of
individuals,” 23 and that the intent of Congress is “that the primary object
of attention in cases brought under the ADA should be whether entities
covered under the ADA have complied with their obligations,” rather
than whether an impairment meets the definition of a disability. 24
Making the legislative disapproval of the Supreme Court’s views more
concrete, the statute provides, “[a]n impairment that is episodic or in
remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity
when active,” 25 and the determination whether an impairment
substantially limits a major life activity is to be made “without regard to
the ameliorative effects of mitigating measures,”26 apart for ordinary
eyeglasses or contact lenses. 27 Examples of mitigating measures to be
disregarded are medication, hearing aids, cochlear implants, mobility
devices, assistive technology, “reasonable accommodations or auxiliary

16

Id. at 489.
Williams, 534 U.S. at 198.
18
See Jill C. Anderson, Just Semantics: The Lost Readings of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
117 YALE L.J. 992, 994–95 (2008) (collecting authorities); Jeannette Cox, Crossroads and
Signposts: The ADA Amendments Act of 2008, 85 IND. L. J. 187, 200-01 (2010) (collecting
additional authorities).
19
See Wendy E. Parmet, Plain Meaning and Mitigating Measures: Judicial Interpretations of the
Meaning of Disability, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 53, 54 (2000).
20
See Bonnie Poitras Tucker, The Supreme Court’s Definition of Disability Under the ADA: A
Return to the Dark Ages, 52 ALA. L. REV. 321, 342 (2000).
21
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 7, 122 Stat. 3553 .
22
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 2(b)(2)-(5).
23
Id. § 3(4)(A).
24
Id. § 2(b)(5).
25
Id. § 3(4)(D).
26
Id. § 3(4)(E)(i)–(ii).
27
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 § 3(4)(E)(ii). Low-vision devices do not count as ordinary
eyeglasses or contact lenses. Id. § 3(4)(E)(i)(I).
17
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aids or services,” as well as “learned behavioral or adaptive neurological
modifications.” 28
The Amendments Act sets out a nonexclusive list of major life
activities drawn from examples previously found in regulations
promulgated under the ADA, but expanded to include sleeping, reading,
concentrating, thinking, and communicating, plus performing manual
tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, walking, speaking, learning, and
working. 29 The term “major life activities” is further defined to cover
operation of major bodily functions, such as “functions of the immune
system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder, neurological,
brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive functions.”30
A person meets the definition of being regarded as having an impairment
that substantially limits a major life activity if the person establishes that
he or she has been subjected to a prohibited action “because of an actual
or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the
impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” 31
The definitional changes in the Amendments Act dramatically
expand the coverage of the ADA and section 504 with respect to
elementary and secondary students. Children who achieve an adequate
level of educational performance but who need medical and other
therapies or supplemental devices, aids, or services as they do so, are
now covered by section 504 and the ADA as long as their impairments
would substantially limit a major life activity if the impairments were not
mitigated. 32 The list of major life activities now explicitly includes
several that are closely tied into education: reading, concentrating,
thinking, communicating, as well as hearing, speaking, and learning. 33
The “operation of a major bodily function” provision expands the laws’
coverage to many children with serious medical conditions even if the
conditions are satisfactorily treated.34 The bar for what “substantially
limits” embraces is now much lower as well. 35
IDEA’s more restrictive coverage provisions remain unchanged,
so the Amendments Act creates the likelihood there will be a large class
of children eligible under the ADA and section 504 who are not covered
by IDEA. Though eligibility of a child under IDEA may not
automatically establish coverage under section 504 and the ADA, noncoverage under section 504 and the ADA of a child covered under IDEA

28

Id. § 3(4)(E)(i)–(ii).
Id. § 3(2)(A).
30
Id. § 3(2)(B).
31
ADA Amendments Act of 2008, § 3(3)(A). This provision does not apply if the impairment is
“transitory and minor”; “[a] transitory impairment is an impairment with an actual or expected
duration of 6 months or less.” Id. § 3(3)(B).
32
Id. § 4(a).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id. § 2(a)(7), (b)(4)–(5).
29
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is exceedingly unlikely. To be eligible under IDEA, a child must have
one or more specified conditions, any of which constitutes a physical or
mental impairment within the meaning of section 504 and the ADA. 36
For all but specific learning disabilities, for which the requirement seems
to be implied, the impairment has to adversely affect educational
performance; for all impairments, the condition must cause a need for
special education and related services.37
An adverse effect on
educational performance appears to be the same thing as a limit on the
major life activity of learning. 38 And if the adverse effect is so great that
it causes the child to need special education and related services, it would
constitute a substantial limit either on learning or on another major life
activity such as reading, concentrating, hearing, speaking, thinking, or
communicating, at least if the impairment is evaluated in its unmitigated
state, and so the child would be covered under section 504 and the ADA.
II.

ENTITLEMENTS UNDER SECTION 504 AND THE ADA

Other writing of mine discusses the obligations of school districts
and correlative entitlements of public school children under section 504
and the ADA. 39 A brief recapitulation of that topic may help to set the
stage for the discussion of procedures and remedies, however, and it will
provide an occasion to consider a few new authorities and clear the
underbrush of some old ones. The current discussion comprises a
description of authorities establishing the section 504 requirement of
meeting the needs of children with disabilities as adequately as the needs
of other children are met, then a critical examination of cases equating
the section 504-ADA standard with that applied in IDEA disputes, and
finally consideration of cases that require plaintiffs in section 504-ADA
actions to show intentional conduct on the part of defendants.

36

20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(3)(A)(i) (West 2012) (“intellectual disability, hearing impairments (including
deafness), speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including blindness), serious
emotional disturbance . . . , orthopedic impairments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health
impairments, or specific learning disabilities”). The test for children aged three to nine is less
specific. Id. § 1401(3)(B)(i).
37
Id. § 1401(3)(A)(ii); 34 C.F.R. § 300.8(c) (2012).
38
Some states have adopted rules demanding that there be a significant adverse effect on the child’s
educational performance for the child to be eligible under IDEA. See, e.g., J.D. v. Pawlet Sch. Dist.,
224 F.3d 60, 67 (2d Cir. 2000) (applying Vermont provision requiring functioning significantly
below expected age or grade norms). In my view, these standards imposing restrictions beyond
what is in IDEA violate the federal statute. See Weber, supra note 6, at 118–19. Nevertheless,
where a child meets such an enhanced standard, the conclusion that there is coverage under section
504 and ADA coverage seems certain.
39
See Weber, supra note 5, at 9-21.
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Meeting Needs as Adequately as Needs of Others Are Met

Title II of the ADA contains a broad prohibition on disability
discrimination, 40 a provision stating that the remedies, procedures and
rights under the title are to be those that relate to section 504,41 and a
delegation of regulatory authority to the Attorney General with a
directive to make the regulations consistent with those promulgated
under section 504. 42
The Attorney General’s regulations forbid
discrimination using broad language, 43 and contain elaborate provisions
regarding accessibility of facilities,44 but delegate to the Department of
Education the responsibility for implementing compliance procedures
relating to elementary and secondary education.45
Regulations promulgated under section 504, which predate the
ADA, require all recipients of federal funding that operate a public
elementary or secondary education program to provide a free,
appropriate public education to each child in the recipient’s jurisdiction
covered by section 504. 46 The section 504 regulations define appropriate
education as “the provision of regular or special education and related
aids and services that (i) are designed to meet individual educational
needs of handicapped persons as adequately as the needs of
nonhandicapped persons are met and (ii) are based upon adherence to
procedures that satisfy the requirements” of Department of Education
regulations regarding educational setting, evaluation and placement, and
procedural safeguards. 47
The requirement of meeting needs as
adequately as the needs of children without disabilities are met furnished
the standard for appropriate education used by the lower courts in Board
of Education v. Rowley 48 but rejected by the Supreme Court in that case
as going beyond what the statute that is now IDEA requires. 49 The
expansion of ADA-section 504 coverage in the ADA Amendments Act,
creating a conspicuous class of children covered by section 504 but not
IDEA, has directed new attention to the as-adequately-met standard.50
Earlier writing of mine on this topic discusses Mark H. v.

40

42 U.S.C.A. § 12132(West 2012).
Id. § 12133.
Id. § 12134(a)-(b).
43
28 C.F.R. §35.149 (2012).
44
Id. §§ 35.150-.152.
45
Id. § 35.190(b)(1).
46
34 C.F.R. § 104.33(a) (2012). The section 504 regulations also forbid unnecessary segregation,
unjustified disparate-impact discrimination, refusal to furnish comparable academic and
nonacademic facilities and settings, and failure to provide reasonable accommodation. See id. §§
104.4, 104.34.
47
Id. § 104.33(b)(1).
48
458 U.S. 176 (1982).
49
Id. at 198 & n.8.
50
See Weber, supra note 5, at 3.
41
42
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Lemahieu 51and Lyons v. Smith, 52 which both establish that the asadequately-met language of the regulation is to be given a
straightforward reading–that it entails comparing the depth and quality of
services provided children without disabilities and those provided
children with disabilities and requires that the children with disabilities
not come out on the short side of the comparison. 53 Moreover, according
to the Office for Civil Rights of the United States Department of
Education, the section 504 appropriate education duty does not
incorporate a cost limit, as might be suggested by a “reasonable
accommodation” standard, but instead such a limit applies only to postsecondary education. 54
Two more recent authorities merit discussion here. One is Mark
H. v. Hamamoto, 55 the appeal after remand of Mark H. v. Lemahieu. In
the Mark H. litigation, parents contended that their two daughters, both
of whom had autistic conditions, were denied adequate services by the
public schools in Hawaii for a protracted period of time. A hearing
officer found that the children were denied appropriate education in
violation of IDEA and ordered prospective relief. 56 The parents then
filed suit for damages, asserting that the failure to provide adequate
services before the hearing and implementation of relief under IDEA
constituted a violation of section 504. 57 The district court granted
summary judgment against the plaintiffs, holding that there is no section
504 cause of action for violation of the right to appropriate education,
and that IDEA is the exclusive avenue for claims that fall within its
scope. 58 In the Lemahieu decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court, ruling that IDEA is not an exclusive remedy 59 and that the
appropriate education duty under IDEA is not identical with that under
section 504. 60 The court stated that the section 504 standard requires “a
comparison between the manner in which the needs of disabled and nondisabled children are met . . . .”61 Because the parents, like the school
system, incorrectly assumed that the standards were identical and that the
failure to provide appropriate education under IDEA as identified by the
hearing officer necessarily established any section 504 claim that might
exist, the case had to be remanded for proceedings on whether the school

51

513 F.3d 922 (9th Cir. 2008).
829 F. Supp. 414, 419 (D.D.C. 1993).
53
Weber, supra note 5, at 11-14.
54
Letter to Zirkel, 20 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 134 (1993).
55
620 F.3d 1090 (9th Cir. 2010).
56
Lemahieu, 513 F.3d at 928.
57
Id. at 930.
58
Id. at 931.
59
Id. at 934–35.
60
Id. at 933.
61
Lemahieu, 513 F. 3d at 933. The court stated that the section 504 regulation also requires a focus
on the design of the child’s educational program, but did not elaborate on how this differs from
IDEA. Id.
52
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system violated the section 504 standard.62 On remand, however, the
district court again entered summary judgment against the plaintiffs.
In the Hamamoto decision, the Ninth Circuit reversed again and
this time assigned the case to a different district judge. 63 According to
the court, the plaintiffs’ damages claim rested on two violations of
section 504: the defendants failed to provide the girls with reasonable
accommodations for their disabilities through autism-specific special
education services, and they failed to design the girls’ educational
programs to meet their needs as adequately as the needs of students
without disabilities were met. 64 The court declared that the reasonable
accommodation damages claim would succeed if “(1) the girls needed
autism-specific services to enjoy meaningful access to the benefits of a
public education, (2) [defendants were] on notice that the girls needed
those autism-specific services but did not provide those services, and (3)
autism-specific
services were available as a
reasonable
accommodation.” 65 The court found that evidence in the record
supported all of these propositions, as well as the allegation that the
defendants acted with deliberate indifference.66
On the damages claim for failure to meet the needs of the girls as
adequately as those of others were met, the court said that the parents
alleged that the girls were unable to access any of the benefits of public
education, and provided evidence that without access to autism-specific
services, they received no meaningful access to education. 67 The court
stated: “Presumably, at a minimum, [the defendants’] education
programs for its non-disabled students allow those students to access at
least some benefits of a public education.” 68 Denial of any benefits
constituted denial of meaningful access, and the defendants’ knowledge
of the as-adequately-met regulation and their failure to provide services
they knew would likely be needed to satisfy the regulation would amount
to deliberate indifference.69
The Hamamoto opinion reaffirms the proposition that reasonable
accommodations and as-adequately-met claims are available under
section 504, and it establishes that denial of equally adequate services
may constitute actionable denial of meaningful access. But since the
plaintiffs alleged denial of any benefit from the educational services
offered the girls, the court did not have to flesh out the comparison
between services received by children with disabilities and those without
disabilities, nor determine when the imbalance is significant enough to

62

Id. at 939–40.
620 F.3d at 1103.
64
Id. at 1093.
65
Id. at 1097.
66
Id. at 1098-99.
67
Id. at 1098.
68
Hamamoto, 620 F.3d at 1101.
69
Id. at 1101-02.
63
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amount to a failure of meaningful access. Moreover, since the claims
were for damages, the court did not discuss how much less plaintiffs
need to plead and prove if all they seek is prospective relief. The
deliberate-indifference standard was minted for damages cases,70 and
decisions in cases demanding other forms of relief have not required the
showing. 71
A second case of note is M.M. v. Lafayette School District, 72
which involved a child with learning disabilities and claims that a school
district failed to timely identify and evaluate the child and provide
adequate services. In considering a motion to dismiss the claim under
section 504 for failure to meet the child’s educational needs as
adequately as the needs of students without disabilities were met, the
court, following Lemahieu, stated that plaintiffs who allege a violation of
the section 504 appropriate education requirement must show something
more than that the IDEA appropriate education requirements were not
met. 73 But the court said the plaintiffs were alleging more than denial of
appropriate education under IDEA: “[T]hey are alleging additionally that
C.M.’s educational needs were not being met ‘as adequately as the
educational needs of nondisabled students were met’: and that the district
failed ‘to develop an IEP that included necessary accommodations to
enable CM to access his education and participate in the general
education curriculum at his ability level with his non-disabled peers.’” 74
Since the claim went to the design of the education, the court allowed the
case to proceed and granted the plaintiffs permission to amend their
complaint to specify the needs not addressed, accommodations not
provided, and regulations thus violated that would support a cause of
action. 75
As with Hamamoto, the procedural posture of the case meant that
there was no occasion to develop the as-adequately-met standard. But
the court did establish that the standard requires no extraordinary
showing: the as-adequately-met language is itself something more than
the IDEA standard, and a claim may be asserted under it by identifying
deficiencies in services and accommodations, which might then be the
basis for the comparison with services provided students who do not
have disabilities.
Ample room exists for further development of the as-adequatelymet standard and its application both in cases seeking damages and in
those seeking prospective relief. Courts appear to be edging towards
70

See Lemahieu, 513 F.3d at 938 (discussing mens rea in section 504 cases).
See , e.g., Lyons v. Smith, 829 F. Supp. 414 (D.D.C. 1993); see also cases cited infra n. 178.
No. C 10-04223 SI, 2011 WL 830261 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2011).
73
Id. at *8.
74
Id.
75
Id. at *9. A lesser showing might be permitted if the plaintiffs are challenging the implementation
of the child’s programs rather than its design. See Wiles v. Dep’t of Educ., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1143,
1158 (D. Haw. 2008) (permitting section 504 claim based on implementation of program to
proceed).
71
72
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drawing the comparison with services provided children without
disabilities that the regulation’s language requires. As my earlier work
sought to demonstrate, this comparison is well within hearing officers’
and courts’ competence, and will require that those school districts that
provide adequate services to students without disabilities provide
adequate services to those with disabilities as well; districts that furnish
high quality or top-of-the-line services to non-disabled students will have
a commensurately higher obligation to students with disabilities. 76

B.

Cases Equating Section 504-ADA and IDEA Obligations

Numerous cases say that if a claim under IDEA fails, the court
may dismiss a claim under section 504 based on the same facts. 77 With
respect, I submit that the statement is incorrect. The only bases for such
a statement would be: (1) IDEA remedies are exclusive and supplant
those under IDEA; (2) A section 504 regulation provides that
“[i]mplementation of an Individualized Education Program developed in
accordance with [IDEA] is one means of meeting the [as-adequatelymet] standard,” 78 so compliance with IDEA is sufficient; (3) The asadequately-met regulation does not mean what it says. The first
proposition is patently false. 79 The second proposition is somewhat more
plausible, but as I have argued elsewhere, the one-means-of-meeting
regulation is most sensibly read to be referring only to the mechanisms
76

See Weber, supra note 5, at 14-15.
E.g., Diaz-Fonseca v. Puerto Rico, 451 F.3d 13, 29 (1st Cir. 2006) (dismissing claims under §
1983, section 504, and Title II in dispute over failure to provide adaptive physical education to
child); Burke v. Brookline Sch. Dist., 257 F. App’x 335 (1st Cir. 2007), aff’d, No. 06-cv-317-JD,
2007 WL 268947 (D.N.H. Jan. 29, 2007) (dismissing damages claims under IDEA and Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act, claims for retaliation and coercion under ADA and claims
based on failure to follow proper procedures under section 504 and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on ground that
claims presented IDEA-based claims in guise of ADA claims), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2934 (U.S.
June 16, 2008); Seladoki v. Bellaire Local Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. C2-07-1272, 2009 WL
4884199, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 14, 2009) (holding that when IDEA claim for denial of appropriate
education failed, claim under section 504 and ADA for denial of appropriate education failed as
well); Emily Z. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A. 06-442, 2007 WL 3174027, at *4 (W.D.
Pa. Oct. 29, 2007) (granting summary judgment for school district on section 504 and ADA claims
on ground they were derivative of IDEA violation claims). But see Edwards v. Fremont Pub. Schs.,
21 INDIVIDUALS WITH DISABILITIES EDUC. L. REP. 903 (D. Neb. 1994) (finding argument that IDEA
is exclusive remedy to be frivolous); Hebert v. Manchester, N.H., Sch. Dist., 833 F. Supp. 80, 81
(D.N.H. 1994) (denying motion to dismiss section 504 claim that overlapped with claim under
IDEA).
78
34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(2) (2012).
79
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l)(2006) (“Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to restrict or limit the
rights, procedures, and remedies available under the Constitution, the Americans with Disabilities
Act of 1990, title V of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, or other Federal laws protecting the rights of
children with disabilities, except that before the filing of a civil action under such laws seeking relief
that is also available under this subchapter, the procedures under [IDEA] shall be exhausted to the
same extent as would be required had the action been brought under this subchapter.”); Weber,
supra note 5, at 19-20.
77
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and procedures of IDEA, not the Rowley standard for appropriate
education; otherwise the as-adequately-met regulation is rendered
surplusage in the common case in which a child is covered by both IDEA
and section 504 80. The third proposition works only if one ignores the
language of the regulation, which is not what hearing officers and courts
interpreting the law ought to do. As indicated above, it is contrary to the
recent, well-considered interpretations in the Mark H. opinions and M.M.
C.

Cases Requiring Intent

Many cases also state that a showing of intent or something like
it─a showing of gross misjudgment or bad faith conduct, or one of
deliberate indifference─is needed to support a claim under section 504
and the ADA for a child with disabilities in an education case. 81 On
closer examination, however, it emerges the courts are discussing
damages claims, and base their conclusions on the caselaw interpreting
title VI of the Civil Rights Act 82 and title IX of the Education
Amendments, 83 which are worded similarly to section 504, and for which
a private right of action exists only for intentional discrimination and
damages are the usual remedy. 84 The comparison of section 504 to these
two statutes is not completely apt, at least when considering claims for
anything other than damages relief. As I have emphasized in earlier
writing, section 504 differs from title VI and title IX in being intended to
cover at least some disparate impacts, that is, non-intentional conduct;
the ADA clearly addresses disparate impact. 85 Moreover, both section
504 and the ADA forbid failure to provide reasonable accommodations,
something that is obviously intentional, 86 but perhaps does not exactly
match the mens rea that courts considering title VI and title IX cases are
talking about when they discuss intent. In any instance, whatever mens
rea might be required for a damages claim does not matter if the claim is
for prospective or other equitable relief.87

80

See Weber, supra note 5, at 20-21.
See, e.g., Birmingham v. Omaha Sch. Dist., 220 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000); Smith v. Special Sch.
Dist. No. 1, 184 F.3d 764 (8th Cir. 1999); Sellers v. Sch. Bd., 141 F.3d 524, 529 (4th Cir.1998);
Scokin v. Texas, 723 F.2d 432, 441 (5th Cir. 1984); Monahan v. Nebraska, 687 F.2d 1164, 1171 (8th
Cir.1982).
82
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2006).
83
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2006).
84
See, e.g., Scokin, 723 F.2d at 441.
85
See Weber, supra note 5, at 18-19 (collecting and discussing authorities).
86
See Lemahieu, 513 F.3d at 938 (“[S]ection 504 itself prohibits actions that deny disabled
individuals ‘meaningful access’ or ‘reasonable accommodations’ for their disabilities.”); Marvin H.
v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist., 714 F.2d 1348, 1356 (5th Cir. 1983) (“[A] cause of action is stated under
§ 504 when it is alleged that a school district has refused to provide reasonable accommodations for
the handicapped plaintiff to receive the full benefits of the school program.”) .
87
Id. (“For purposes of determining whether a particular regulation is ever enforceable through the
implied right of action contained in the statute, the pertinent question is simply whether the
81
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Courts have recently acknowledged that intent or proxies for
intent will not be required in all section 504 and ADA cases regarding
children with disabilities in public schools. A 2010 decision from the
Northern District of Illinois relied on Seventh Circuit precedent 88
interpreting the Supreme Court’s decision in Alexander v. Choate89 to
conclude that an individual may show exclusion or discrimination in
violation of the ADA with “evidence (1) the school acted intentionally
on the basis of the disability; (2) the school refused to provide a
reasonable modification; or (3) a rule disproportionally impacts the
disabled.” 90 The court said that the relevant question was whether the
denial of services to the child “affected [the child’s] access to education
in relation to nondisabled students.” 91 The court declined to apply any
standard of bad faith or gross misjudgment. 92 Ultimately, however, it
granted summary judgment for the public school system, ruling that none
of the services the student alleged he had been denied contributed to his
failure at school. 93 The court said that the child’s removal from a general
education English class to a self-contained one for special education
students, when he could have participated in the general education class
with accommodations, could present a valid claim, but the claim was not
properly exhausted through the administrative process.94
D.

Additional Substantive Educational Obligations

There are additional educational obligations that section 504 and
the ADA impose on public schools. These duties include avoiding the
exclusion 95 of children with disabilities from school, establishing

regulation falls within the scope of the statute’s prohibition. The mens rea necessary to support a
damages remedy is not pertinent at that stage of the analysis.”).
88
Washington v. Ind. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, Inc., 181 F.3d 840, 847 (7th Cir. 1999).
89
469 U.S. 287, 295-97 (1985).
90
Brown v. Dist. 299-Chicago Pub. Schs., 762 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1083-84 (2010).
91
Id. at 1084.
92
Id. at 1085 n.8.
93
Id. at 1085.
94
Id.; see also MARK C. WEBER, SPECIAL EDUCATION LAW AND LITIGATION TREATISE § 21.6(3)
(2008 & supp. 2010) (collecting cases upholding section 504 and ADA title II liability without
requiring showing of intent).
95
Bess v. Kanawha County Bd. of Educ., No. CIV.A. 2:08-CV-01020, 2009 WL 3062974 (S.D. W.
Va. Sept. 17, 2009) (upholding section 504 and ADA claims based on school district inducing parent
to keep child with disabilities home from school); B.T. v. Dep’t of Educ., State of Haw., No. CIV
08-00356 DAEB-MK, 2009 WL 1978184 (D. Haw. July 7, 2009) (denying defendant’s motion for
summary judgment in claim that state rule prohibiting children with disabilities from continuing
special education services after reaching age twenty when general education students face no such
prohibition violates IDEA and section 504); K.F. v. Francis Howell R-III Sch. Dist., No. 4:07 CV
01691 ERW, 2008 WL 723751 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2008) (denying motion to dismiss complaint
requesting damages and compensatory education in suit brought under section 504 and ADA over
practice of school for two years to dismiss student with disabilities three hours earlier than students
without disabilities on Wednesday of each week).
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protection against harassment on the basis of disability, 96 and avoiding
segregation of children with disabilities. 97 Section 504 and the ADA
also offer protection for children in the student disciplinary process. 98
The classic case from the courts of appeals requiring that children with
disabilities be afforded special rights with regard to school discipline is
S-1 v. Turlington, which relied on section 504 as well as the statute that
is now IDEA in holding that a student with a disability may not be
expelled for misconduct that results from the child’s disability, and that
before any expulsion “a trained and knowledgeable group of persons
must determine whether the student’s misconduct bears a relationship to
his” or her disability. 99 The court held that the right to manifestation
review is necessarily entailed by the duty not to discriminate on the
ground of disability. 100 The principles that S-1 established continue to be
vital. 101 In N.T. v. Baltimore City Board of School Commissioners, a
2011 case, the court held that allegations about a manifestation meeting
that was held without advance notice to the parent and at which the child
was not permitted to say anything or given other basic procedural rights
stated a valid section 504 claim. 102

96
Enright v. Springfield Sch. Dist., No. 04-CV-1653, 2007 WL 4570970 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 27, 2007)
(denying renewed motion for directed verdict and new trial in action ending in $400,000 verdict
against school district over exposure of seven-year-old child with ADHD and Asperger’s syndrome
to indecent display and other sexual conduct and language on school bus, upholding claims under
IDEA, ADA, and section 504); see Mark C. Weber, Disability Harassment in the Public Schools, 43
Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1079, 1093–1110 (2002) (collecting cases).
97
L.M.P. v. Sch. Bd. of Broward County, Fla., 516 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (denying
motion to dismiss claims based on section 504 and state law as well as class claims based on IDEA
when parents of triplets alleged that school district automatically denied applied behavioral analysis
services to children with autism, segregating them in an insular private school).
98
See generally Perry A. Zirkel, Suspensions and Expulsions Under Section 504: A Comparative
Overview, 226 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 9 (2008) (discussing disciplinary process protections); Perry
A. Zirkel, Discipline Under Section 504 and the ADA, 146 WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 617 (2000)
(same).
99
635 F.2d 342, 350 (5th Cir. 1981). The court’s reliance on section 504 was essential to the
holding, given that at least some of the plaintiffs in the case were expelled before the effective date
of the predecessor of IDEA. See id. at 344, 350.
100
Id. at 346.
101
Additional cases upholding rights in the school disciplinary process under section 504 include:
Dean v. Sch. Dist. of City of Niagara Falls, 615 F. Supp. 2d 63 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (upholding right to
notice concerning expulsion under IDEA and section 504); M.G. v. Crisfield, 547 F. Supp. 2d 399
(D.N.J. 2008) (denying motion to dismiss section 1983 procedural due process claim and section 504
claim based on discrimination against person regarded as having disability in case of third-grader
suspended indefinitely for misconduct whose parents alleged that defendants conditioned continued
educational services on their consent to accepting placement in special education school for child in
another district). See generally Perry A. Zirkel, Discipline Under Section 504 and the ADA, 146
WEST’S EDUC. L. REP. 617 (2000) (collecting Office for Civil Rights decisions in complaints
concerning discipline).
102
No. JKB–11–356, 2011 WL 3747751, *8 (D. Md. Aug. 23, 2011). The court applied a bad faith
or gross misjudgment standard. Id. See generally PERRY A. ZIRKEL, SECTION 504: STUDENTS,
LEGAL REQUIREMENTS, AND PRACTICAL RECOMMENDATIONS 18-19 (2005) (discussing procedural
issues in section 504 disciplinary matters).
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III. PROCEDURES UNDER SECTION 504 AND THE ADA
IDEA contains an elaborate mechanism for resolving disputes,
including the perhaps optimistically named “due process hearing,” 103 as
well as rights to obtain independent educational evaluations,104 to keep
the child in the child’s current educational placement during the
pendency of proceedings, 105 and to be represented by counsel or others,
present evidence, confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance of
witnesses at the hearing. 106 The section 504 regulation on the subject is
much less specific, but requires public elementary and secondary
education providers to afford children who need or are believed to need
special education due to disability “a system of procedural safeguards
that includes notice, an opportunity . . . to examine relevant records, an
impartial hearing with opportunity for participation by the person’s
parents or guardian and representation by counsel, and a review
procedure.” 107 Although the section 504 regulation states that voluntarily
affording the safeguards provided in IDEA satisfies the obligations
imposed by section 504, 108 the regulation nowhere requires identical
procedures. School districts may, if they choose, establish a hearing
system different from that which applies to IDEA disputes. Indeed,
IDEA hearing officers in a number of jurisdictions lack the authority to
entertain section 504 claims. 109
Given the bare-bones language of the section 504 regulation, it
makes sense to ask whether some basic procedural safeguards may be
imposed either by implication or by the operation of other legal
authority. These guarantees might include the right to a service plan or
other document constituting a final offer of services, which may be used
as the basis for a hearing request; impartiality rights, including
prohibition on service as hearing officers by officials of neighboring
school districts or state educational agency personnel; rights to subpoena
witnesses for hearing and to cross-examine witnesses; and judicial
review.

103

20 U.S.C. § 1415(f) (2006).
34 C.F.R. § 300.502 (2012).
105
20 U.S.C. § 1415(j) (2006).
106
Id. § 1415(h).
107
34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2010).
108
See id.
109
See, e.g., Indep. Sch. Dist. of Boise City No. 1, 112 LRP 16142 (Idaho Educ. Agency 2012)
(disavowing authority to hear section 504 claim); In re Student with a Disability, 112 LRP 5356
(N.M. Educ. Agency 2012) (same). But see Swope v. Cent. York Sch. Dist., 796 F. Supp. 2d 592,
602 (M.D. Pa. 2011) (“Plaintiff’s unsupported statement that hearing officers do not have
jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s ADA and Section 504 claims also fails. No statutory or case law
supports this assertion.”).
104
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A. Service Plans

A major virtue of IDEA’s requirement of an Individualized
Education Program (IEP) for each child with a disability is that the
document represents the school district’s final offer of what services it
will provide to comply with the law’s obligations. If the parent wants
more or different services, the IEP is what to challenge. If the parent
believes that the school system is not following through on its
commitments, the IEP is what to compare with the services that are
actually being delivered. For children who are served under section 504
but not IDEA, many school districts create a service plan, which fills the
same role. Nevertheless, Professor Zirkel, who has studied section 504
extensively, has recently concluded that “[i]n the judicial forum, the odds
are likely but not certain that the court would rule in favor of the
defendant school district that does not provide a 504 plan . . . .” 110 He
bases his conclusion on the uncertain status with regard to judicial
enforceability of the section 504 regulations,111 the difficulty with
success of a claim on the merits, and the tendency of courts to view
procedural failings as harmless error. 112 As he notes, the section 504
regulations do not require a plan, whereas IDEA requires one and goes
into great detail about its contents. 113
If Professor Zirkel is correct, parents who wish to make section
504 claims will face some practical problems pinning down the position
of the school district when they assert claims at a hearing or in court.
They will need to rely on general communications, rather than a single
document designed to convey clearly what the school district believes the
child ought to receive under the law. Cases challenging the application
of broad policies may benefit from reference to public pronouncements
or documents obtained from Freedom of Information Act requests.
Individual decisions might be discerned from the student records that the

110

Zirkel, supra note 10, at 414-15 (2011).
Compare Power v. Sch. Bd. of Virginia Beach, 276 F. Supp. 2d 515 (E.D. Va. 2003) (finding no
private right of action to enforce procedural obligations imposed by section 504 regulations in school
discipline dispute), with J.P.E.H. v. Hooksett Sch. Dist., No. 07-cv-276-SM, 2007 WL 4893334
(D.N.H. Dec. 18, 2007) (report and recommendation of magistrate judge) (permitting service of
IDEA claims, section 504 claims, and state law claims arising out of alleged failure to provide
appropriate IEP to child, failing to properly implement IEP by providing required information to and
contact with parent, failing to provide impartial due process hearing, and failing to provide sufficient
notice and hearing or furnish child with advocate before finding child ineligible for continued special
education services), adopted, Campbell v. Hooksett Sch. Dist., 2008 WL 145099 (D.N.H. Jan. 15,
2008). See generally Weber, supra note 5, at 22-23 (questioning persuasiveness of Power’s
analysis).
112
Zirkel, supra note 10, at 414-15.
113
Id. at 411 (“Conspicuously missing--and fitting with a pattern of much more streamlined
procedural safeguards of Section 504 than those of the IDEA--is a 504 plan. In comparison, the
IDEA legislation provides not only a definition but multiple pages of requirements for an
individualized education program (IEP), and the IDEA regulations provide further specifications as
to its development, contents, and revisions.”) (footnotes omitted).
111
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section 504 regulations, and various student record laws, enable the
parents to examine. 114 In an extreme case, a parent might argue that the
school district’s decision making is so opaque or capricious that
constitutional due process has been violated and that violation may
become a claim in its own right. 115 In any instance, the absence of a
service plan creates a high risk of confusion if the case gets to hearing
and the parent and school district dispute what services are actually being
offered or delivered.

B. Impartiality of Hearing Officers

The section 504 regulations guarantee an impartial hearing, 116 but
say nothing more on the subject. IDEA, by contrast, provides:
Person conducting hearing. A hearing officer
conducting a hearing pursuant to paragraph (1)(A) shall,
at a minimum-(i) not be-(I) an employee of the State educational agency or
the local educational agency involved in the education or
care of the child; or
(II) a person having a personal or professional
interest that conflicts with the person's objectivity in the
hearing; 117
The leading case applying this language, Mayson v. Teague, ruled
that individuals working for school districts other than the district
involved in the hearing and state university personnel who had an
involvement in formulating special education policies for the state could
not serve as hearing officers. 118 The factual history recounted in that
case showed that after school districts complained to the state
superintendent about the districts’ negative experiences in due process
cases, the hearing panels selected by the superintendent shifted to being

114

See 34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2012).
Cf. White v. Roughton, 530 F.2d 750, 753-54 (7th Cir. 1976) (holding that making welfare
eligibility determinations based on unwritten personal standards violated due process. See generally
Mark C. Weber, Services for Private School Students Under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Improvement Act: Issues of Statutory Entitlement, Religious Liberty, and Procedural
Regularity, 36 JOURNAL OF LAW AND EDUCATION 163 (2007) (discussing White’s applicability to
decisions regarding publicly funded special educational services for private school children).
116
34 C.F.R. § 104.36 (2012).
117
20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(3)(A) (2006).
118
749 F.2d 652 (11th Cir. 1984)
115
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composed predominantly of local school system employees. 119 The court
of appeals reasoned that the district court did not err in concluding that
employees of local school boards other than the one from which the child
receives services are involved in the education and care of the child, in
light of their close connection to the state’s administration of educational
policy. 120 Moreover, the susceptibility of local school personnel to
influence and political pressure, even when they work for districts other
than the one serving the child, constituted personal or professional
interests conflicting with the individuals’ objectivity in the hearing. 121
The court also considered university personnel involved in formulating
state policies to be involved in the education and care of special
education children as a group, and found a conflicting interest in the
difficulty a person formulating a policy would have in reversing or
modifying the policy as a hearing officer.122
Not all courts have gone as far as Mayson in interpreting the IDEA
provision, 123 and the section 504 regulation, of course, lacks IDEA’s
specificity. But one needs little imagination to conclude that section 504
hearing officers who are employees of other school districts, much less
those who are employees of the district involved in the hearing, lack the
independence of thought and action to be impartial. A court has also
barred a state superintendent of public education from serving as an
IDEA hearing officer; 124 it would be reasonable to conclude that a
superintendent or other state agency supervisory personnel would lack
the necessary independence in section 504 cases as well. Similarly,
people who have formulated statewide or district-wide policies should
not be the ones hearing challenges to the policies. The Second Circuit
Court of Appeals ruled that a parent had standing to challenge a state
procedure by which a school board selected an IDEA hearing officer
from a list of state-certified individuals, and the person selected held the
hearing and made a recommendation to the board. 125 The court
emphasized that “It is elementary that the provision of a fair hearing
before an impartial tribunal is a basic requirement of due process” under
the Constitution, even though the challenge in the case relied solely on
the statute. 126 Indeed, the Supreme Court has held that Fourteenth
Amendment due process rights are violated when an adjudicator has a

119

Id. at 656.
Id. at 658.
Id.
122
Id. at 659.
123
See L.B. v. Nebo Sch. Dist., 379 f.3d 966 (10th Cir. 2004) (finding that employment by district
other than one involved in hearing did not disqualify hearing officer); see also Silvio v.
Commonwealth, 439 A.2d 893 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1982), aff’d 456 A.2d 1366 (Pa. 1983) (finding
state university personnel in general not disqualified by virtue of employment by state department of
education).
124
Robert M. v. Benton, 634 F.2d 1139, 1142 (8th Cir. 1980).
125
Heldman v. Sobol, 962 F.2d 148, 158 (2d Cir. 1992).
126
Id. at 154.
120
121
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stake in the outcome of the case.127 Interests that threaten impartiality
undermine constitutional due process rights in section 504 cases just as
they do in cases under IDEA and other laws.

C. Hearing Rights

The right to subpoena witnesses would appear to be fundamental,
and is found in IDEA 128 and state administrative codes applicable to
IDEA. 129 The same right ought to apply to hearings under section 504.
As for presentation of oral testimony and cross examination, the very
term “hearing” suggests the ability to put forward testimony and crossexamine opposing witnesses. Although these rights are not spelled out in
the section 504 regulations, they should be considered to be implied. If
there were any doubt on the matter, principles of procedural due process
under the Constitution would call for these rights to be afforded. In
Goldberg v. Kelly, the Supreme Court ruled that confronting adverse
witnesses and presenting one’s own arguments and evidence orally are
due process minima in the context of a proposed termination of welfare
benefits. 130 When one is considering the deprivation of education, “the
very foundation of good citizenship,” for which “it is doubtful that any
child may reasonably expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity,” 131 the level of procedural due process protection needs to
be high. 132 It would surely be great enough to compel the same rights

127

See Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 579 (1973); Ward v. Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57, 59-60
(1972); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 531-33 (1927).
20 U.S.C. § 1415(h)(2)(2006).
129
See, e.g., ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 23, § 226.660 (2012).
130
397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970).
131
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); see also Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221
(1982) (“Public education is not a “right” granted to individuals by the Constitution.. But neither is
it merely some governmental “benefit” indistinguishable from other forms of social welfare
legislation. Both the importance of education in maintaining our basic institutions, and the lasting
impact of its deprivation on the life of the child, mark the distinction. The “American people have
always regarded education and [the] acquisition of knowledge as matters of supreme importance.”
We have recognized “the public schools as a most vital civic institution for the preservation of a
democratic system of government,” and as the primary vehicle for transmitting “the values on which
our society rests.” “[A]s ... pointed out early in our history, ... some degree of education is necessary
to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to
preserve freedom and independence.” And these historic “perceptions of the public schools as
inculcating fundamental values necessary to the maintenance of a democratic political system have
been confirmed by the observations of social scientists.” In addition, education provides the basic
tools by which individuals might lead economically productive lives to the benefit of us all. In sum,
education has a fundamental role in maintaining the fabric of our society. We cannot ignore the
significant social costs borne by our Nation when select groups are denied the means to absorb the
values and skills upon which our social order rests.”) (citations omitted).
132
See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (“[I]dentification of the specific dictates of
due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the private interest that
will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
128
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to effective participation in a hearing as found to be required for a pretermination welfare eligibility hearing or a claim for relief from being
required to repay government benefits. 133 Cross-examination, “the
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,” 134 is a
particularly important component of due process when life-altering
interests are stake and the risk of erroneous decisions by school officials
is significant.

D. Judicial Review

The section 504 regulation requires a “review procedure,” but
does not specify what that means. Professor Zirkel and a co-author state
that this appears to mean judicial review, not an additional administrative
review, and that the review would be in federal court “without the
concurrent option of state court.” 135 This interpretation could be correct,
though a Department of Education regulation on administrative
safeguards would be an odd place to put a grant of federal jurisdiction,
and the default rule with regard to federal jurisdiction is that it is
concurrent. 136 In any case, there is federal jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 for claims that section 504 and its regulations have been violated,
and a cause of action may be found under the statute itself or under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, so judicial review in federal court seems to be a given for
the aggrieved child and parent acting as next friend. 137 Of course, a
school district is not a person with a disability covered by section 504 or

safeguards; and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”).
133
See Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 696-97 (1979) (upholding injunction requiring oral
hearing in which claimant for waiver of repayment of benefits may present testimony and evidence
and cross-examine witnesses).
134
California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158, (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed.
1940)). One Department of Education regional office letter of finding from 1996 declined to find a
violation of section 504 when a hearing officer in a section 504 dispute did not allow crossexamination but did allow participants to ask follow-up questions and obtain clarification when
necessary. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 25 Individuals with Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. 163 (U.S. Dep’t
of Educ. Office for Civil Rights, S. Div., Dallas). The decision contains no mention of precedent, no
discussion of rights in proceedings under analogous laws, and no consideration of due process
requirements.
135
Perry A. Zirkel & Brooke L. McGuire, A Roadmap to Legal Dispute Resolution for Students with
Disabilities, 23 J. SPECIAL EDUC. LEADERSHIP 100, 107 (2010). The authors cite two administrative
decisions considering section 504 hearing procedures that lack a second level of administrative
review. Since having two tiers of administrative review was the dominant practice in the early years
of the law that is now IDEA, the regulation may well be referring to a second-level review, however
odd that may seem nowadays.
136
Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 459 (1990) (noting “deeply rooted presumption in favor of
concurrent state court jurisdiction”).
137
See Weber, supra note 5, at 22-23 (discussing implied right of action under section 504 and
explicit cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to enforce section 504 procedural safeguards
provision).
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the ADA, and, there is no explicit conferral of any right to sue on the
school district, unlike the situation with IDEA. 138 Hence, there is no
federal law basis on which a school district can appeal an unfavorable
section 504 administrative hearing decision.139
Judicial review of hearing officer decisions under IDEA is highly
deferential. Courts must give due weight to administrative rulings when
they consider appeals of IDEA cases,140 even though the courts are
explicitly directed to hear evidence at the request of a party. 141 The basis
for the deferential standard in IDEA cases is that the statutory
“requirement that the reviewing court ‘receive the records of the [state]
administrative proceedings’ carries with it the implied requirement that
due weight shall be given to these proceedings.” 142 In the absence of any
similar statutory requirement in section 504, at least one court has held
that the ordinary standards of summary judgment should apply to section
504 cases, rather than the deferential summary judgment or review-onthe-record standards ordinarily used by courts in IDEA proceedings. 143
Exhaustion defenses may apply in section 504-ADA actions when
the relief sought is also available under IDEA, 144 and courts have been
known to require that the factual basis for the specific section 504 claim
be raised in the administrative proceedings, even when the parent is
acting pro se. 145 Earlier writing of mine takes up exhaustion and its
exceptions in section 504 cases at some length, 146 and other
commentators have weighed in on the topic. 147 A major recent
development requires discussion, however: the Ninth Circuit’s en banc
decision in Payne v. Peninsula School District. 148
In Payne, a damages case brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
asserting constitutional violations, the parent alleged that a child with
138
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(A) (2006) (“Any party aggrieved by the findings and decision . . .
shall have the right to bring a civil action . . . .”).
139
Bd. of Educ. of Howard County v. Smith, No. Civ. RDB 04-4016, 2005 WL 913119, at *3 (D.
Md. Apr. 20, 2005) (“[W]hile an individual can assert the original jurisdiction of this Court on a
claim under the Rehabilitation Act, the institution alleged to have violated the provisions of Section
504 cannot directly seek to assert an appeal from a decision by a state administrative law judge
directly to federal court by asserting original jurisdiction.”).
140
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206 (1982).
141
20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2)(C)(ii) (2006).
142
Rowley, 458 U.S. at 206.
143
Bd. of Educ. v. Ross, 486 F.3d 267, 278 (7th Cir. 2007) (holding that district court on review of
hearing officer decision in section 504-ADA case should apply ordinary summary judgment standard
rather than deferential standard used in IDEA cases).
144
See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2006).
145
Brown v. Dist. 299-Chicago Pub. Schs., 762 F. Supp. 2d 1076, 1085-86 (N.D. Ill 2010)
(“Represented at the hearing by his mother, [plaintiff] need not have specifically mentioned the
ADA or discrimination at the hearing. But he was required to present the issues underlying his ADA
claim so that the hearing officer had the opportunity to consider a remedy.”).
146
See Weber, supra note 5, at 25-26; see also WEBER, supra note 94, § 21.8 (collecting and
analyzing section 504 and ADA cases on exhaustion).
147
See, e.g., Peter J. Maher, Note, Caution on Exhaustion: The Courts’ Misinterpretation of the
IDEA’s Exhaustion Requirement for Claims Brought by Students Covered by Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA but Not by the IDEA, 44 CONN. L. REV. 259 (2011).
148
653 F.3d 863 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, No. 11-539, 2012 WL 538336 (U.S. 2011).
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autism and motor apraxia was repeatedly locked in a closet-like time out
room without supervision over the course of a school year. 149 While
confined, the child would take off his clothes and would urinate and
defecate on himself. 150 The court overturned the district court’s
dismissal of the case for failure to exhaust administrative remedies and
remanded. 151 The court reexamined the statutory provision on which the
exhaustion requirement is based, which permits claims under the
Constitution, section 504, and the ADA, but says that “before the filing
of a civil action under such laws seeking relief that is also available
under [IDEA], the [due process hearing] procedures . . . shall be
exhausted to the same extent as would be required had the action been
brought under [IDEA].” 152 The court ruled that the exhaustion
requirement is not jurisdictional,153 and, following the language of the
statute, held that “[n]on-IDEA claims that do not seek relief available
under the IDEA are not subject to the exhaustion requirement even if
they allege injuries that could conceivably have been redressed by the
IDEA.” The court overruled earlier cases using an “injury-centered
approach,” and adopted a “relief-centered approach.” 154 Instead of
treating the IDEA section as “a quasi-preemption provision, requiring
administrative exhaustion for any case that falls within the general ‘field’
of educating disabled students,” 155 a court should look “at the prayer for
relief and determine whether the relief is also available under the
IDEA.” 156
According to the court, exhaustion would be required in three
instances: when the “plaintiff seeks an IDEA remedy or its functional
equivalent,” such as a tuition reimbursement case, even if brought under
the ADA rather than IDEA; when the plaintiff seeks prospective relief to
alter an IEP or educational placement even if the remedy is sought under
a statute other than IDEA, and third, when the plaintiff “is seeking to
enforce rights that arise as a result of a denial of free appropriate public
education, whether pled as an IDEA claim or any other claim that relies
on the denial of a FAPE to provide the basis for the cause of action,”
such as a section 504 damages claim “premised on a denial of a
FAPE.” 157 The court rejected its previous distinction between cases
alleging physical injuries and those alleging non-physical injuries. 158 It
also said that damages should not be assumed to be equivalent to

149

Id. at 866.
Id.
151
Id. at 884.
152
20 U.S.C. § 1415(l) (2006).
153
Payne, 653 F.3d at 870.
154
Id. at 874.
155
Id. at 875.
156
Id.
157
Id.
158
Payne, 653 F. 3d at 876.
150
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enhanced services that might be available in an IDEA proceeding. 159 “If
the measure of damages is limited to the cost of counseling, tutoring, or
private schooling—relief available under the IDEA—then the IDEA
requires exhaustion.” 160 But “a plausible claim for damages unrelated to
the deprivation of a FAPE” does not need exhaustion.161
In general, claims independent of IDEA do not require exhaustion:
“If a complaint can stand on its own without reference to the IDEA, it is
difficult to see why the IDEA should compel its dismissal.” The court
said that “[t]he fact that the plaintiff could have added IDEA claims to an
otherwise sound complaint (and thus subjected themselves to the
exhaustion requirement), but chose not to, should not detract from the
viability of the complaint.”162 The nature of the complaint in Payne, one
of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, seems to stand
well apart from a claim for deprivation of appropriate education under
IDEA. By contrast, some section 504 and ADA cases brought by parents
of children who are eligible under IDEA might fall under the exhaustion
requirement if they are seeking educational services that IDEA might
provide, or reimbursement for obtaining those services on the private
market. Further developments will be needed to outline the precise
contours of Payne’s rule in cases brought under section 504 and IDEA.
but the rule seems plainly to provide a smaller reach for the exhaustion
defense than had been the case under previous interpretations.
Of course, Payne does nothing to undermine, and appears to
reinforce, the conclusion that if the child is by the school district’s own
admission not eligible for services under IDEA, exhaustion is not
required. 163 If the child is not eligible under IDEA, the relief sought is
not available under that statute. Moreover, if a hearing is sought but
refused in a section 504 case, exhaustion should be excused on the
ground of futility. 164

159

Id.
Id. at 877.
Id.
162
Id.
163
See Weber, supra note 5, at 26; Zirkel, supra note 10, at 414 n.42 (“[T]he exhaustion language is
within the IDEA and arguably only applies to students double-covered by the IDEA and Section
504.”); Maher, supra note 147, at 299 (“[Courts] erroneously have required parents to exhaust their
Section 504/ADA claims under the IDEA’s due process procedures even when a student is not
eligible for services under IDEA.”); see also D.R. v. Anetelope Valley Union High Sch. Dist., 746 F.
Supp. 2d 1132, 1145 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“Thus, in fact and in law, Plaintiff is not a child with
disability as defined under IDEA or an individual with exceptional needs as defined under the
[California] Education Code. Since Plaintiff is not eligible for relief under IDEA she does not need
to administratively exhaust her remedies to assert claims under Section 504, the ADA, and the
Unruh Act.”).
164
McNeal v. Duval County Sch. Bd., No. 3:11–cv–00498–J–32MCR, 2011 WL 6010293, at *8
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2011).
160
161
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IV. REMEDIES
Remedies in section 604-ADA cases involving the education of
children with disabilities might include compensatory damages, tuition
reimbursement, orders for future conduct, and ancillary relief such as
attorneys’ fees and expert witness fees.

A. Compensatory Damages

At least in cases of intentional conduct, or conduct that meets
gross misjudgment or bad faith or deliberate indifference standards,
compensatory damages are available for violations of section 504 and the
ADA. 165 This conclusion is unsurprising. Section 504 adopts the
remedies available under title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,166 and
title II of the ADA adopts the remedies available under section 504. 167
The Supreme Court has upheld damages awards under title IX of the
Education Amendments of 1972, 168 which the Court interprets
consistently with title VI of the Civil Rights Act. 169 The Court said that
under title IX, damages are available “where a funding recipient
intentionally violates the statute.”170 Applying this principle to peer
sexual harassment, the Court held that school districts may be liable for
damages on the basis of in violation of title IX if the district
administrator or administrators are deliberately indifferent to known
conduct that is severe or pervasive enough to deprive the victim of equal
access to an educational program or activity. 171
As noted above, the reach of section 504 and the ADA is broader
than that of title VI and title IX, which have been read to embrace only
intentional discrimination. Instead, section 504 and the ADA title II
forbid at least some disparate impacts and require the provision of
accommodations.172 Accordingly, the title VI and title IX precedent
should not necessarily be read to restrict damages awards under section
165

See, e.g., M.P. v. Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 721, 326 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2003); Miles v. Cushing Pub.
Schs., No. CIV-06-1431-D, 2008 WL 4619857 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 16, 2008).
166
29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2) (adopting remedies under Civil Rights Act title VI, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d
to 2000d-7).
167
42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2006).
168
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 70-71 (1992) (construing Education
Amendments title IX, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (2006).
169
Barnes v. Gorman, 526 U.S. 181, 185 (2002) (“[T]he court has interpreted Title IX consistently
with Title VI . . . .”).
170
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 642 (1999). The Court suggested the use of
a similar test for teacher sexual harassment of students in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District, 524 U.S. 274, 283 (1998).
171
Davis, 526 U.S. at 651.
172
See supra text accompanying notes 85-94 (discussing analogy to title VI and title IX).
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504 and title II to the intentional discrimination situations covered by a
title VI-title IX analogy. 173 At the minimum, however, damages should
be available for conduct that manifests deliberate indifference or
otherwise indicates intent. 174
Hearing officers may view entry of a damages award in a section
504 proceeding as beyond their authority. 175 If hearing officers in
section 504 cases are thought not to have that power, there may arise a
situation rather like that regarding attorneys’ fees under IDEA, where the
hearing officer awards whatever relief is within his or her authority and
the prevailing claimant then files an action for the additional relief
available from a court.176
B.

Tuition Reimbursement and Orders for Future Conduct

Relief other than compensatory damages ought to be as extensive
under section 504 and the ADA as under IDEA, and accordingly should
embrace reimbursement awards for tuition and privately obtained related
services, orders for future conduct, records amendment orders, and the
like. In Lyons v. Smith, the District of Columbia district court reversed a
decision by a hearing officer refusing to exercise authority to order a
placement for a child upon a finding that the school system failed to meet
section 504 requirements. 177 Other courts have ordered or upheld orders
for ongoing educational services, compensatory education, and similar
remedies in section 504 or ADA cases. 178
173
See generally Sande Buhai & Nina Golden, Adding Insult to Injury: Discriminatory Intent as a
Prerequisite to Damages Under the ADA, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 1121 (2000) (contending that proof
of intent should not be required in ADA cases).
174
See Mark H. v. Lemahieu, 513 F.3d 922, 939 (9th Cir. (2008). Although the Supreme Court
disallowed punitive damages as a remedy under ADA title II in Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181,
189 (2002), the Court did nothing to challenge the proposition that compensatory damages are
available, and left undisturbed the $1 million compensatory award in that case.
175
This appears to be the conclusion reached in IDEA cases that have entertained the possibility of
damages relief. See Perry A. Zirkel, The Remedial Authority of Hearing and Review Officers Under
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 31 J. NAT'L ASS'N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 1, 42
(2011) (“Although a minority of courts have taken the view that money damages are available under
the IDEA, it is generally accepted that this form of relief is not within H/ROs’ authority.”) (footnotes
omitted).
176
See, e.g., Barlow-Gresham Union High Sch. Dist. No. 2 v. Mitchell, 940 F.2d 1280 (9th Cir.
1991).
177
Lyons v. Smith, 829 F. Supp. 414, 419–20 (D.D.C. 1993) (“[T]he court finds that a hearing
officer may order [the public school system] to provide special education to a student designated as
‘otherwise qualified handicapped’ under § 504, but may only do so under appropriate circumstances.
. . . [I]n some situations, a school system may have to provide special education to a handicapped
individual in order to meet the educational needs of a handicapped student ‘as adequately as the
needs’ of a nonhandicapped student, as required by § 104.33(b)(1).” (quoting Smith v. Robinson,
468 U.S. 992, 1016 (1984))).
178
J.T. v. Mo. State Bd. of Educ., No. 4:08CV1431RWS, 2009 WL 262094, at *7 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 4,
2009) (denying motion to dismiss claim for violation of section 504 and ADA in action over alleged
failure to provide appropriate education to child in state school, holding that permissible relief could
include audio-visual monitoring to allow independent parental review of activities and monitoring of
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Attorneys’ Fees and Expert Witness Fees

Both section 504 and the ADA provide for fees for prevailing
claimants. The ADA specifically allows for fees in administrative
proceedings. 179 Section 504’s fees provision states: “In any action or
proceeding to enforce or charge a violation of a provision of this
subchapter, the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party,
other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee as part of the
costs.” 180 This language mimics Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which has been held to permit attorneys’ fees for administrative
proceedings that must be pursued to file the claim in court. 181 An action
may be filed solely for fees after the claimant has prevailed in the
administrative proceedings. The Supreme Court in a case interpreting
the applicable provision from title VII stated: : “Since it is clear that
Congress intended to authorize fee awards for work done in
administrative proceedings, we must conclude that [Title VII]’s
authorization of a civil suit in federal court encompasses a suit solely to
obtain an award of attorney's fees for legal work done in state and local
proceedings.” 182
The ADA fees provision includes “litigation expenses, and
costs,” 183 which would seem to embrace the fees that parents in special
education cases frequently need to pay to expert witnesses. Although the
Supreme Court has ruled that the attorneys’ fees provision in IDEA does
not cover expert witness fees, 184 a court has held that the section 504 fees
provision extends to those charges. 185

child’s safety); Neena S. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. CIV.A. 05-5404, 2008 WL 5273546 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 19, 2008) (affirming limited award of compensatory education for long-term failure to provide
appropriate special education services); Damian J. v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., No. CIV.A. 06-3866, 2008
WL 191176, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 22, 2008) (awarding compensatory education under IDEA and
section 504); Lower Merion Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 931 A.2d 640, 644 (Pa. 2007) (finding private school
child not deemed eligible for services under IDEA entitled to occupational therapy services at public
school under section 504).
179
42 U.S.C.A. § 12205 (West 2010) (“In any action or administrative proceeding commenced
pursuant to this chapter, the court or agency, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs . . .”).
180
29 U.S.C. § 794a(b) (2006).
181
N.Y. Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 71 (1980).
182
N.Y. Gaslight Club, 447 U.S. at 66. Although the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Act has been held
not to permit a separate action for attorneys’ fees if the claimant has been successful in his or her
claim on the merits in administrative proceedings and nothing remains to litigate in court, N.C. Dep’t
of Transp. v. Crest St. Cmty. Council, 479 U.S. 6, 13–15 (1986), the language in that statute is
different from that of Title VII and section 504, see id.. at 13–14.
183
42 U.S.C. § 12205 (2006).
184
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 297–98 (2006).
185
L.T. ex rel. B.T. v. Mansfield Twp. Sch. Dist., No. CIV.A.04-1381(NLH), 2009 WL 2488181
(D.N.J. Aug. 11, 2009) (disallowing expert witness fees under IDEA but allowing expert witness
fees under section 504 claim).
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CONCLUSION
As more parents turn to section 504 and the ADA in special
education cases, the administrative law judiciary will face hard questions
about procedures and remedies under those laws. This Article suggests
some answers, applying methods that look to the text of the relevant
provisions and underlying constitutional principles to find a robust set of
procedural protections and remedial options.

